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VERTICAL MERGER IN SUPPLY CHAIN: COORDINATION UNDER 
NASH BARGAINING SOLUTIOIN 
SUMMARY 
In this study, we discuss cooperation decision in two echelon supply chain consisting 
of two competitive manufacturers and two competitive retailers. We assume that, 
each manufacturer produces a homogenous price dependent product, and sells the 
goods through an exclusive retailer to end consumers. The manufacturers also utilize 
advertising campaign to improve product image, and to get consumer attention. We 
consider a sequential move game structure where manufacturers decide advertising 
level in the first stage and wholesale price in the second stage of the game. The 
competing retailers decide retail price in the final stage of the game. We determine 
the behaviors of agents in supply chain for a vertical merger. The vertical merger 
occurred between one manufacturer and one retailer, and we obtain two competing 
channel after the merger. We assume that the manufacturer in the first chain is more 
productive than the manufacturer in the second chain. When the firms merged, each 
manufacturer provides her exclusive retailer with the product at a cost equal to 
marginal production cost. In order to ensure the coordination among vertically 
related supply chain members, we use Nash arbitration scheme as a revenue sharing 
contract. We compare Nash bargaining solution with equal division rule. We find 
that under Nash arbitration scheme the total profit of chain, and individual profit of 
each member increase. Moreover, we determine the effect of exogenous variables on 
the equilibrium values through numerical examples. 
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TEDARĠK ZĠNCĠRĠNDE DĠKEY BĠRLEġME: NASH PAZARLIK ÇÖZÜMÜ 
ALTINDA KOORDĠNASYON 
ÖZET
Bu çalışmada, iki rakip üretici ve iki rakip perakendeciden oluşan iki aşamalı bir 
tedarik zincirinde firmaların işbirliği kararlarını inceledik. Her bir üretici homojen bir 
ürün üretmekte ve bu ürünü kendi perakendecisi vasıtasıyla tüketicilere satmaktadır. 
Ayrıca, üretici reklam kampanyası yoluyla ürün imajını artırmayı ve tüketicilerin 
dikkatini çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Üreticinin birinci aşamada reklam kararını, kinci 
aşamada toptan fiyat kararını aldığı ardışık hareketli bir oyun yapısını inceledik. 
Ardışık karar alma oyunun son aşamasında perakendeci firma ürünün perakende 
fiyatını belirliyor. Tedarik zincirindeki firmaların dikey birleşme kararlarını 
belirlemeye çalıştık. Bir üretici ve bir perakendeci arasında oluşan dikey birleşme 
kararı sonrasında rekabetçi iki tedarik zinciri oluşmaktadır. Birinci zincirdeki üretici 
ikinci zincirdekinden daha üretkendir. Firmalar dikey olarak birleştiklerinde, her bir 
üretici ürünü perakendeciye üretim maliyetinden satmaktadır. Dikey olarak ilişkili 
olan firmaların işbirliğini sağlamak için Nash paylaşım kuralını bir kâr paylaşım 
kontratı olarak inceledik. Ayrıca, Nash bölüşüm kuralını eşit kâr paylaşım kuralıyla 
karşılaştırdık. Nash bölüşüm kuralı altında zincirin toplam kârı ve her bir firmanın 
bireysel kârının arığını bulduk. Ek olarak, dışsal parametrelerin denge değerleri 
üzerine olan etkilerini nümerik olarak inceledik. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the coordination problem among supply chain members has been studied 
in many researches. Constant wholesale price, revenue sharing, buyback, price 
discount sharing, cost sharing are some specific contracts types that has been applied 
to make the firms in supply chain to work in collaboration. Cachon and Lariviere 
[2005] and Zhou and Yang [2008] studied a revenue sharing contract where the 
manufacturer sells the product at a price less than marginal production cost, and the 
retailer share a percentage of revenue with manufacturer. Cachon and Laiviere 
[2000] study revenue sharing contract in multi echelon supply chain, and they 
compare with other coordination contracts. Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo [2002] 
study a three stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a distributer, and a 
retailer. The contract model is characterized by two different contracts: the first 
contract is offered between distributer and retailer, the second contract is offered 
between manufacturer and retailer. Leng and Zhu [2009] study a two echelon supply 
chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. They study revenue sharing contract 
satisfying Nash arbitration scheme and Shapley value. Li et al. [2008] study a supply 
chain system with one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer decides 
output and retail price, and the retailer determines revenue sharing contract under 
Nash bargaining solution.  
  
Most of the studies about revenue sharing contracts in supply chain management 
focus on optimum sharing coefficient. In other words, these studies focus on a 
proportion of sales revenue paid from one player to the other. However, in this study 
we concern about Nash bargaining scheme as a revenue sharing contract. 
 
In this study our aim is to analyze the behavior of supply chain members under 
vertical merger. The profit of the agents in the supply chain depends on both own 
behavior and other member behaviors. We analyze the possible action of channel 
members under three scenarios. In the first scenario, we investigate the case when all 
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members of the supply chain under decentralized channel system. In the second 
scenario, we analyze whether the firms in the chain have incentives for merger. Also 
we investigate the conditions for a profitable merger. In addition to that, we analyze 
the behavior of rival chain when one of them has incentive for merger. In other 
words, we investigate the possible action of a chain when rival chain gets more profit 
with merger. In the third scenario, we analyze the Nash equilibrium of the chains, 
and share the profit of the channel system according to Nash bargaining solution.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Contracts and Coordination in SCM 
Bernstein and Federgruen [2003] consider a two-echelon supply chain consists of 
one supplier and n-competing retailers. The supplier distributes a single product or 
closely substitutable products to n-competing retailers who face deterministic price 
dependent demand function. The price of each retailer that he can charge for his 
product depends on the all retailers’ order quantity. The author first characterizes the 
solution of centralized system in which all parameters are determined by a single 
agent. Then, they proceed with the decentralized channel system where the supplier 
chooses a whole sale pricing scheme, and the retailers determine their policy 
variables dependent on the supplier strategy. They compare the equilibrium under 
Cournot and Bertrand competition. Finally, Bernstein and Federgruen [2003] derived 
a perfect coordination mechanism. Under Cournot competition, for example, the 
mechanism applies a discount from whole sale price. Under this discount scheme the 
centralized solution arises as Nash equilibrium. The authors assess the value of 
coordination within a decentralized system. They consider the Stackelberg game 
structure in which supplier acts as a leader and retailers as followers. They show that 
Stackelberg solution often result in major loses in the supply-chain-wide profit. 
Lal [1990] construct a model consist of a manufacturer and a retailer. In this model 
Lal [1990] study the role of franchising arrangement in improving supply chain 
coordination. He focuses on the use of royalties and monitoring the franchise 
activities to improve coordination between chain members. 
Wanhang [2004] introduces the notion of a rational sharing rule in a cooperative 
game structure. According to Wanhang [2004] not every coordinating sharing rules 
are stable. Sometimes, it is possible to find a subset of the players who can do better 
when not participating in any contracts. However, under the rational contract that is 
offered by Wanhang [2004] every subsets of the players receive no less than the 
amount when collaborating on their own.  
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Horn and Wolinsky [1988] consider an industry consist of two firms that produce 
either substitutable or complement products, and suppliers of the two firms. They 
consider two cases regarding the structure of the upstream industry. In one case the 
supplier are independent of one another and in the other case suppliers merged and 
acts as a monopoly input supplier. The whole sale price is determined in bargaining 
between firms and suppliers. 
Ziss [1995] construct a model that allows either upstream or downstream merger, and 
leave the remaining stage intact as a duopoly. The game structure between 
manufacturer and retailer is as follows; in the first stage the manufacturer 
simultaneously choose a two part tariff consisting of a wholesale price and a fixed 
fee, in the second stage the retailers simultaneously choose retail price. 
Milliou and Petrakis [2007] consider a model with two upstream and two 
downstream firms. Their model explores the role of bargaining and contract type in 
horizontal merger that take place in the upstream sectors of vertically related 
industries. The game structure is as follows; in the stage one the upstream firms take 
merger decision. In other words, they decide whether to merge or not. In the stage 
two, they choose contract types. If the upstream firms decide to merge horizontally, 
in stage three, monopolist upstream firm bargains with downstream firms separately 
and simultaneously for the contract terms. They show that if upstream firms prefer to 
remain separated, two part tariff contracts are always chosen in equilibrium. 
Fontenay and Gons [2005] construct a model to analyze vertical integration under 
upstream competition and monopoly. In their model there are two upstream and two 
downstream firms. They demonstrate that vertical integration of upstream 
monopolist creates a higher industry profit then upstream competition. 
Klastorion et al. [2002] consider a decentralized two-echelon distribution system 
consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers. In this model a price discount 
scheme is offered to retailer who places his order which coincides with the beginning 
of manufacturer production cycle. 
Trivedi [1998] constructs a differentiated product model to analyze channel 
competition at the both manufacturer and retailer levels. In this model Trivedi [1998] 
investigates the effect of various power structures on equilibrium price and profits. In 
5 
 
other words, the model analyzes the market structure when the manufacturer and 
retailer play the Stackelberg leader respectively. 
Xiao and Yang [2008] investigate the competition between two independent supply 
chains each of which consist of a risk-neutral supplier acting as Stackelberg leader 
and a risk averse retailer acting as Stackelberg follower. In this game structure the 
retailers compete in service investment and retail price, and the suppliers compete in 
wholesale price under demand uncertainty. They found that risk sensitivity/demand 
uncertainty of one retailer influence the optimal decision of agents in the rival 
channel. The degree of the service investment of one retailer influences the optimal 
retail price and service level of his rival. 
Not only price, but also some important non-price factors influence the consumers’ 
preferences. Iyer [2000] construct a model to analyze the effort of manufacturer 
coordinating channel when retailer compete in price, and non-price factors such as 
the provision of product information, free repair, faster check-out etc. 
Esmaeili [2009] construct a model to analyze the interaction among seller and buyer 
by using non-cooperative and cooperative game theory. In non-cooperative situation 
seller-Stackelberg and buyer-Stackelberg scenarios are analyzed separately. For the 
cooperative situation a Pareto efficient solution is provided for the model. They show 
that selling and marketing expenditure are smaller in cooperative than non-
cooperative games. 
Dumrangsiri et al. [2008] consider a supply chain model in which the single product 
is sold to the retailer as well as to the consumer directly by the manufacturer in a 
single selling period. Consumers are free to choose either the retailer channel or the 
direct channel, but their decision depends on the price and service quality. In this 
model the manufacturer decides the price of the direct channel, and the retailer 
decides the retail price and order quantity. The result show that if the retailer’s 
marginal cost is high , and the wholesale price, consumer valuation and the demand 
variability is low the centralized dual channel outperforms the centralized single 
channel. 
McGuire and Staelin [1983] study a channel structure with two upstream 
manufacturers and two downstream retailers. In this supply chain system each of two 
manufacturers sells its product through a single retailer. The two different 
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manufacturers are either vertically integrates with their retailer or not. A static linear 
demand and cost function are used. Different game structures are analyzed and the 
results are compared and contrast. The game structures used in this model are as 
follow; firstly, the manufacturer sells its product through retailer store to end 
consumes. Secondly, the manufacturer directly sells its product to end consumers. 
Thirdly, the manufacturer sells its product through retailer company and directly to 
end consumers. The results show that consumers are best off when the manufacturer 
sells its product directly to end consumers. If the manufacturers act in collision 
profits are greater and retail prices are lower with a pure company store than with 
privately owned dealers 
2.2 Advertisement Affects in SCM 
He et al. [2009] investigate a theoretical analysis of co-op advertising plans in a 
dynamic stochastic supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. In 
their model the manufacturer produces a product and wholesale it to the retailer who 
then sales the product to end consumers. They use a Stackelberg game structure in 
which the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader and the retailer acts as a 
Stackelberg follower. In particular, before the selling season the manufacturer 
announces a whole sale price and the percentage of retail advertising that it will 
contribute, then the retailer orders retail quantity. They show that in the absence of 
coordinated co-op advertising and pricing strategies, the optimal price is always 
higher in decentralized channel structure, and the advertising amount is below the 
optimal advertising level. 
Li et al. [2002] investigate cooperative and non-cooperative game structure to 
analyze the local and brand advertising effects on pricing, production and profit of 
agents. They analyze the system equilibriums under three models. They found that 
the channel profit is maximized in the cooperative game structure in which the cost 
of local advertising is shared between the agents. In order to find the best sharing 
policy, a cooperative bargaining model is constructed by the authors. However, the 
analysis conducted by Li et al. [2002] depends on the assumption that the 
manufacturer’s marginal profit is large enough. Xie and Ai [2006] extended the 
result found by Li et al. [2002] to the case where the manufacturer’s marginal profit 
is not large enough. 
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Huang et al. [2002] consider a single manufacturer and single retailer supply chain in 
which a single product is produced and sold. They try to determine optimal national 
advertising and local advertising efforts for the supply chain members. Two different 
strategies namely partnership and leader-follower strategies are analyzed in terms of 
national advertising investment, local advertising expenditure, and sharing rules for 
advertising expenses. They show that the system total profit, national advertising 
investment, and local advertising spending are higher under partnership strategy than 
leader follower strategy. 
Szmerekovsky and Zhang [2009] consider a model to analyze the pricing and two-
tier advertising decisions between a manufacturer and a retailer. In their model the 
non-linear demand depends on the retail price and advertisement expenses by the 
manufacturer and the retailer. They consider a game theoretical environment where 
the manufacturer is more powerful and acting as a Stackelberg leader, and the retailer 
acting as follower. They show that, sharing the cost of local advertising between 
manufacturer and retailer is not a good strategy to improve system profit. However, it 
is better for the system profit if the manufacturer advertises nationally and offers a 
lower wholesale price to the retailer. 
As emphasized in many papers consumers’ purchasing decision is influenced not 
only by product selling price but also by service quality, advertisement etc. Tsay and 
Agrawal [2000] consider a distribution system where two competing retailers order a 
common product from a single manufacturer. Then the retailers use service quality 
and selling price to compete for end users. Tsay and Agrawal [2000] focus on the 
impact of competition on selling price, total sales, service quality and profitability. 
They also characterize a wholesale pricing scheme to coordinate the whole system. 
 
One of the main objectives of the firms is to gain profit or promote product as much 
as possible. In order to reach this aim retailer always offer discount to the consumers. 
Ping et al. [2010] study a vertical cooperative advertising in a two echelon supply 
chain system when retailer offer discount to consumers. Firstly they investigate 
Stackelberg game structure where the manufacturer act as a leader and the retailer 
acts as follower in a price sensitive market environment. Then, they consider a Nash 
co-op game structure, and compared and contrast the result found in the two 
scenarios. They show that cooperative strategy is better than non-cooperative 
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strategy in terms of advertising level, discount, order quantity, and system profit. For 
the coordination of the supply chain Ping et al. [2010] share the profit between 
manufacturer and retailer with Nash bargaining model. 
2.3 Revenue Sharing Contracts in SCM 
Zhou and Yang [2008] construct a multi-echelon supply chain model with a 
deterministic price-sensitive demand. In their study they propose a supply chain 
contract model to coordinate pricing decision through revenue sharing mechanism. 
Krishnan and Winter [2010] studied a supply chain model consisting of one 
manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer distributes the product 
through retailers in a infinite horizon discrete time period.  Their study reexamines 
revenue-sharing contracts in a vertical supply chain incorporating downstream 
competition. The retailer ability to carry over inventory from one period to the next 
extends the traditional static framework to incorporate dynamics one. 
Li et al. [2008] construct a model with two-echelon supply chain consisting of one 
upstream manufacturer and one downstream retailer. They consider the model under 
the consignment contract with revenue sharing. The market demand is price sensitive 
and uncertain. In this supply chain the manufacturer produces a single-period 
product, and sells through retailer to end consumers. The manufacturer decides the 
delivery quantity and the retail price, and the retailer decides the revenue shares. 
They show that the optimal retail price is the same as the optimal retail price the 
centralized supply chain, and is always less than the optimal retail price in a non-
cooperative situation. Numerically they found that, in a cooperative situation the 
supply chain channel supplies more product quantity with a lower retail price. 
Therefore, the supply chain members and the end consumers obtain more benefits 
from the cooperation. 
Giannoccaro and Pontrondolfo [2004] focus on the supply chain contracts addressing 
buyer-supplier coordination. Their model based on revenue sharing contract. They 
propose the model to coordinate a three-level supply chain. Two different contracts 
are used in the model. The first contract is offered by the distributer to the retailer, 
and the second contract is offered by the manufacturer to the distributer. They show 
that the integrated design of two contracts lets the retailer and the distributer select 
order quantities that are optimal for the whole supply chain. 
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Wang [2004] construct a model consisting of one supplier and n-retailers in a non-
cooperative game structure. The contract in this model based on profit sharing 
scheme which is decided with the participation of all members rather than one 
powerful agent. 
Cachon and Lariviere [2005] study a single supplier, single retailer supply chain 
model which includes both deterministic and stochastic demand function. They aim 
to investigate how revenue sharing contract alters the performance of supply chain. 
Then, they compare and contrast revenue sharing mechanism to several other 
contracts, such as, buy-back, price discount, quantity discount, franchise. The 
revenue of supply chain is determined by retailers’ purchase quantity and retail price. 
They found that the model assures the supply chain coordination, and arbitrarily 
allocates the chain profit between the agents. Finally the authors extend their model 
by including competing retailers. 
  
10 
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3. THE BASIC MODEL 
As we mentioned in the introduction section, we investigate the incentive behaviors 
of the firms for vertical merger. Our main objective is to analyze the behaviors of the 
agents for a profitable merger. In our model there are two upstream and two 
downstream firms. The upstream firms (here after manufacturers, index as M1 and 
M2) produce a homogenous product, and sell the product to downstream firms (here 
after retailers index as, R1 and R2) with a whole sale price determined by the 
manufacturers. The retailers then sell the product to end consumers. The retailers 
compete with each other by pricing to maximize their profit. The manufacturers also 
compete by whole sale pricing, and advertising to gain maximum profit depending 
on the competitive retailers’ response. The following figure represents the nature of 
the supply chain model. 
 
Figure 3.1: Supply chain model structure 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Manufacturer1 Manufacturer2 
Retailer1 Retailer2 
Consumers 
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Following Leng and Zhu [2009] who proposes            , we use the 
following deterministic linear price sensitive inverse demand function.  Moreover, to 
analyze the effect of advertising on equilibrium values we add an advertisement term 
to our inverse demand function, and then we got our inverse demand function:  
                       
In our model we use a homogenous product model in which the final product is sold 
to end consumers with same retail price  .  Table 3.1 summarizes the description of 
parameters.  
Table 3.1: Definition of parameters 
  Retail price  
  Demand intercept 
   The order quantity of retailer i, i=1,2 
   Advertising expenditure of manufacturer i, i=1,2 
  The demand coefficient  
  Advertising coefficient 
   Wholesale price of manufacturer i  for retailer i, i=1,2 
  The cost of advertising 
   The marginal production cost of manufacturer i, i=1,2 
The coefficients   and   are assumed to be positive constants, and the parameters are 
assumed to satisfy the following condition           
3.1 Model Analysis: Benchmark Case (No Advertisement Ai = 0)  
3.1.1  The Competitive Model 
In this section, we will investigate a non-cooperative situation between supply chain 
agents. In this model both manufacturers and retailers remain separate, and maximize 
their own profit. We assume that each manufacturer sells its product to only one 
specific retailer. In other words, the supply chain system that we consider in this part 
is an exclusive dealer channel [Choi, 1996]. In stage 1, the manufacturers decide 
their advertisement level. In stage 2, the manufacturers determine a whole sale price 
for their product. The retailers decide the order quantity in the final stage. The agents 
of the supply chain compete a la Cournot. Figure 3.2 summarizes the game structure 
13 
 
for the competitive model. We use backwards induction to find the sub-game perfect 
Nash Equilibriums. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The stages of the game 
Due to the drop of advertisement term in general inverse demand function, the 
inverse demand function for this section reduced to: 
                                                     
(3.1) 
The profit function of retailers (R1 and R2) is:  
                                                
(3.2) 
                                                
(3.3) 
The retailer1 pays    for the product ordered from manufacturer1, and retailer2 pays 
   for the product ordered from manufacturer2. Retailers will take into account the 
behavior of other agents, and make the optimal decision to maximize their own 
profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manufacturer1  
Decides A1 
Manufacturer1  
Decides W1 
Manufacturer2 
Decides W2 
Manufacturer2  
Decides A2 
Retailer1  
Decides q1 
Retailer2  
Decides q2 
Stage1 
Stage2 
Stage3 
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Stage2 
At the third stage we discus retailers how to decide the optimal order quantity. At 
this stage the retailers decide their order quantity levels that maximize their profit 
taking the other players actions into consideration.  In other words, a retailer can find 
the optimal decisions by reacting the other retailer’s response. The equilibrium 
quantities found at this stage are a function of wholesale price, and other exogenous 
parameters. The Cournot equilibrium quantities are found by maximizing the profit 
function of each retailer. Taking the first order derivative of (3.2) and (3.3) as shown 
below,  
 
    
   
   
    
   
   
We obtain the following reaction functions; 
    
         
  
 
                                                                                                
      
    
         
                                                                                                   
      
Solving       and       simultaneously we get the following Cournot-Nash 
equilibriums 
  
  
        
                                                                                                          
      
  
  
        
                                                                                                          
      
We have to check second order conditions to be sure that the equilibrium quantities 
that we found in       and       maximize the retailers’ profit.  
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Since   is positive the conditions in       is satisfied. Hence we showed that profit 
functions of retailers are concave with respect to quantities. Moreover, we must show 
that the equilibriums are stable and unique. To show the conditions for the 
uniqueness and stability the following determinant should be hold. 
|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|    
                                                                                                   
      
The inequality       is already satisfied, since the computation of the 
inequality       gives     which is always greater than zero. 
Stage1 
In the second stage of the game, the manufacturers choose their wholesale price 
levels. The profit functions of the manufacturers are given bellow. 
             
                                                                                                        
       
             
                                                                                                        
       
After the substitution of equilibrium quantities   
  and   
  that we found in stage2 into 
the equations        and        we obtain; 
    
                  
                                                                            
       
    
                  
                                                                            
       
If we set the derivative of        and        with respect    and   equal to zero, 
and solve the equations for the wholesale prices simultaneously, we obtain the 
optimal wholesale prices that maximize the profits of manufacturers. 
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Solving        and        simultaneously we get the following Cournot-Nash 
equilibriums; 
  
  
 
  
            
                                                                                           
       
  
  
 
  
            
                                                                                           
       
For a maximum profit, second order condition should be negative. 
     
   
    
 
  
  
                                                                                                      
       
     
   
    
 
  
  
                                                                                                      
       
Equations        and        verify that the second order conditions. 
After substitution of Nash-Counot equilibrium quantities and wholesale prices into 
the profit functions (3.2), (3.3), (3.12), and (3.13) we obtain the following optimal 
equilibrium profits for manufacturers and retailers. 
           Table 3.2: Nash-Cournot optimal profits (A=0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 The Centralized Model 
In the centralized channel structure each manufacturer and her exclusive retailer act 
together to maximize the channel total profit. In this model, each manufacturer 
produce a homogenous product with a marginal cost ci (i=1, 2), and sell the product 
to the retailer with wholesale price equal to marginal production cost. Then the 
retailer sells the product to end consumers with a retail price p. The two chains 
                   Profits 
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compete a la Cournot. The total system profit is shared between manufacturer and 
retailer according to Nash bargaining rule.  
We use backwards induction to find the sub-game perfect Nash Equilibriums. The 
profit functions of chain 1 and chain 2 are given in equations        and       . 
            
                                                                                                           
        
 
            
                                                                                                           
       
  is the inverse demand function in      .  (Ci indicate: Chain i, i=1,2) 
In this stage of the game the retailers compete for quantity level. Differentiating     
and     with respect to    and    respectively, setting the derivatives equal to zero 
and solving for    and    , we get the following reaction functions for quantity. 
    
         
                                                                                                    
       
    
         
                                                                                                   
       
If we simultaneously solve the equations        and         we get the optimal 
quantity levels as follows. 
  
  
        
                                                                                                            
       
  
  
        
                                                                                                            
       
In order to be sure about the concavity of profit functions with respect to quantities, 
we have to check the second order conditions. 
     
   
        
                                                                                                        
       
     
   
        
                                                                                                        
       
Since     the second order conditions are satisfied. Since the profit functions of 
the channel 1 and channel 2 are concave in q1 and q2, we are sure about profit 
maximizing level of quantity.  In the centralized model, there is no wholesale price, 
since we assume the members of the each chain collaborate to maximize the system 
profit. The manufacturers provide retailer with product at a cost equal to marginal 
production cost. Therefore, in centralized channel structure we have only one 
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decision variable which is quantity sold in the retail market. Clearly the stability 
conditions are satisfied since the following determinant is hold. 
|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|        
Hence the equilibrium Nash-Cournot quantity decision makes the system total profit 
maximal. After substitution of equilibrium quantities that we found in equation 
       and        into the profit function of chain 1 and chain 2, we obtain the 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium profits as in        and       . 
     
 
          
 
                                                                                                
      
 
     
          
 
                                                                                                 
       
3.1.3 The Model Comparison 
In this section we will compare the different behaviors of supply chain members. The 
competitive model and centralized model will be analyzed and compared according 
to profits. The analysis will be conducted for each chain separately. 
Chain1 Analysis 
Is merger profitable for supply chain members?  For a merger to be profitable, the 
total profit after the merger should be greater than the total profit of manufacturer 
and retailer when they make decision independently. Therefore the following 
inequality must be verified. 
               
                                                                                                  
       
The left hand side of inequality in        indicates merger profit of the supply 
chain. The right hand side, on the other hand, indicates the total profit of 
manufacturer and retailer under the decentralized channel structure. When we replace 
the corresponding terms into the inequality        , we obtain the inequality in the 
equation       . 
          
 
  
  
             
 
    
 
             
 
     
 
                     
       
After simplifying the equation        for  , we get the condition stated in       . 
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Chain 2 Analysis 
If we conduct the similar analysis for the second chain, we realized that the condition 
stated in equation        is not satisfied. That is to say, merger is not profitable for 
the second chain of the model. 
               
           
                                                                                              
We reach the conclusion that the total profit of the second chain under competitive 
model is always greater than the profit under centralized channel structure. 
          
 
  
  
             
 
     
 
             
 
    
                             
Proposition 1: If the market size is small enough merger is profitable for chain1, 
given that the first chain manufacturer has a smaller marginal production cost than 
the second chain manufacturer. 
Proposition 2: Merger, acting in collusion, is not profitable for the second chain 
given that second channel manufacturer has a larger production cost. 
Due to the higher production cost chain 2 is not as efficient as chain 1. It is clear that, 
if the model include only chain 2, then merger would be profitable for the second 
chain. However, the presence of competition between two chains leads to the 
condition stated in the proposition 2. 
3.1.4 Numerical Analysis 
To make the statements clear, we conduct some numerical values to exogenous 
variables satisfying stability and second order conditions. In our analysis we make 
the following assumptions. 
              
The following numerical values of parameters verify all necessary conditions. 
    ,      ,     
As illustrated in the following figure, as far as        merger is profitable for the 
first chain.  
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Figure 3.3: Chain 1 profit analysis 
On the other hand, chain 2 does not gain any advantage from merger. Figure 3.4 
shows that,   for any value    less than    the total profit of the manufacturer2 and 
retailer2 before the merger is greater than the chain profit after the merger.  
 
Figure 3.4: Chain 2 profit analysis  
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At least for some   chain 1 has an incentive for merger, but chain 2 not. Under that 
condition chain1 members will act together. Put differently, the manufacturer and the 
retailer in chain 1 will merge for small market sizes. We have shown that merger is 
not profitable for chain 2. However, if chain 1 merges, then chain 2 will either merge 
or remain separated. We have already shown the merger decision of the second chain 
above. Now, we are going to analyze the condition when the chain 2 remains 
separated.  
The merger profit function of chain1 and the independent profits of chain 2 agents 
are the same as the equation in        ,       and (3.11) respectively. Again we use 
backward induction to find Nash-Cournot equilibriums. In stage 2, chain 1 and 
retailer 2 decide their profit maximizing quantity level. Taking the derivative of 
profit functions with respect to quantities, setting equal to zero, and solving the 
obtained equations simultaneously, we obtain Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantities 
that make the profit of chain 1 and retailer2 maximal.  
    
        
            
                                                                                                    
    
        
            
                                                                                                    
In stage 2, second order conditions is hold, since      
In stage 1 manufacturer 2 decides wholesale price for retailer 2. After we substitute 
the Cournot equilibrium quantities stated in the equation        and       , into 
the profit function        we obtain the new profit function as shown by the 
equation        below. 
              
                                                                                                   
       
In order to maximize the profit function in       ,  one take the derivative of the 
equation  with respect to wholesale price, and then solve for   .  We obtain the 
following reaction function: 
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The second order condition for wholesale price level of the manufacturer 2 is equal 
to: 
     
   
    
 
  
  
                                                                                                      
       
Since the second order derivative with respect wholesale price is negative, we can 
state that the profit function of manufacturer two is concave in wholesale price, and 
the first order condition provide the profit maximizing level of wholesale price. 
After we substitute the equilibrium wholesale price we have found in        into the 
equilibrium quantities that stated by the expression in        and       , we obtain 
the following Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantities.  
   
  
          
   
                                                                                                          
   
  
        
  
                                                                                                               
After we substitute Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantities and wholesale price into the 
profit function of chain 1, manufacturer 2 and retailer 2 we obtain the following 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium profits. 
 ̅   
            
 
    
                                                                                                  
 ̅   
          
 
   
                                                                                                      
 ̅   
          
 
   
                                                                                                       
Comparison of Second Chain Agents Decision 
The possible reactions of the second chain members for the merger decision of chain 
1 are either merger or remain separated. In this section, we will compare the profit of 
second chain members under two different conditions. In order to show which 
reaction of chain 2 is a best response to merger decision of chain 1, we will compare 
the total profit of second chain under two cases (merger and remain separated). 
      ̅    ̅                                                                                                                
Lefts hand side of equation        is the profit of chain 2 when the agents of the 
chain take merger decision as a response to the merger decision of chain 1. Right 
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hand side of equation        is the total profit of the second chain, when the 
members of the chain remain separated. We show that if chain 1 takes merger 
decision, then the best response reaction for chain 2 is to take merger decision. If we 
replace the profit functions       ,       ,        in        and simplifies the 
inequality we obtain the following equation which is always true. 
          
 
 
                                                                                                                
Hence, we prove that at least for some small market sizes chain 1 has incentive for 
merger. In other words, acting in collusion is a rational behavior for the first chain 
agents. Therefore, manufacturer 1 and retailer 1 will cooperate. Although the second 
chain merger profit is smaller than the total profit of the second chain agents in 
competitive model, it is greater than the total profit of second chain agents when 
chain 1 merge, but chain 2 remain separated. Therefore, the game will result in 
merger decision of both chains. 
3.2 Inclusion of Advertisement in the Model 
In benchmark case we conduct the core analysis of the model without advertisement. 
In this section we include the advertisement in the model, and we perform a similar 
analysis. All the assumptions in section 3.1 are also viable in this section. We have 
examined the behavior of agents in each chain without advertisement. Now, we will 
investigate the effect of advertisement on members’ decision in each chain. In this 
section we also share the profit between the agents according to Nash bargaining 
scheme. 
3.2.1 The Competitive Model 
 
In this section we investigate the pure decentralized model in which all the agents 
aim to maximize their own profit. The follow of the game is represented in the figure 
3.2 above. As we emphasized in benchmark case the nature of the game is sequential 
move game. In the first stage of the game, the manufacturers compete to decide 
optimal advertisement level. In the second stage of the game, the manufacturers 
determine the wholesale price. In the final stage of the game, the retailers compete to 
decide quantities which they sold to end consumers. We apply backward induction 
method in order to find optimal quantities, optimal wholesale price, and optimal 
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advertisement level. Backward induction is a process of reasoning backward in time, 
from the end of a problem or a situation, to determine a sequence of optimal actions. 
It proceeds by first considering the last time a decision might be made and choosing 
what to do in any situation at that time (Gang, 1998). The inverse demand function 
is; 
                                                                                                         
Stage 3: Retailer Determine Output Levels 
 Taking the rival firm quantity as given, each retailer determines their profit 
maximizing output level. The equilibrium quantities that we have found at this stage 
are a function of wholesale prices and advertisements. The profit functions of 
retailer1 and retailer2 are given in        and        respectively. 
                                                                                          
                                                                                         
After we simultaneously solve the reaction function that we have found by setting the 
first order condition equal to zero, we obtain the following profit maximizing 
quantities for retailer1 and retailer2 respectively. 
    
   
   
 ̅  
                
  
                                                                                     
    
   
   
 ̅  
                
  
                                                                                     
Second order conditions of the profit functions in the equation       and        
equal to     which is always negative, since we assume that   is positive. Hence, 
we can conclude that the profit functions of retailers are concave in q1 and q2. The 
stability condition is satisfied, since the determinant in        is always satisfied. 
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|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|                                                                                                    
Since the stability is a necessary condition for concavity, the equilibrium quantities 
in         and        are unique. 
Stage 2: Manufacturers Determine Wholesale Price Level 
In this stage of the game, each manufacturer choose her wholesale price level taking 
the rival wholesale price decision as given. After we substitute the equilibrium 
quantities we have found in equation       and        into the manufacturers’ 
profit functions, we obtain the new profit functions as shown below; 
            ̅  
   
 
 
                                                                                                 
            ̅  
   
 
 
                                                                                                 
In order to find the optimal wholesale price level, we take the first order derivatives 
of the equation        and        with respect to wholesale prices    and    
respectively. Setting the derivatives equal to zero, and solving for    and    we get 
the following reaction functions; 
    
   
   
   
 
 
                                                                                                 
    
   
   
   
 
 
                                                                                                 
When we solve the equations       and        simultaneously, we get the profit 
maximizing advertisement level of manufacturers as follows; 
 ̅  
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 ̅  
 
  
                                                                                         
Second order conditions of       and        are equal to   
 
  
) which always 
negative. Therefore, the profit functions of manufacturers are concave in wholesale 
prices. The stability conditions are tested by the following determinant. 
|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|  
 
   
                                                                                             
Since the stability and second order conditions are satisfied, we can assure that the 
optimal wholesale prices can make the manufacturers’ profit maximal. 
Stage 1: Manufacturers Determine Advertisement Level 
In this stage of the game the manufacturers set their advertisement level for their 
product. The advertisement is very important for a product’s retail price, product 
image, and product competitiveness. Therefore, manufacturers give importance to 
advertisement.  After substituting the optimal wholesale prices that we found in stage 
2 into the manufacturers’ profit functions, we restructure the profit functions as 
shown in        and        
      ̅      ̅  
   
 
 
                                                                                                 
      ̅      ̅  
   
 
 
                                                                                                 
We find the optimal advertisement level which makes the manufacturers’ profit 
maximal by simultaneously solving the reaction functions that we found by taking 
the first order derivatives of        and        and setting equal to zero. 
    
   
   
 ̅  
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 ̅  
                         
          
               
                                         
For concavity of advertisement level the denominator term in parenthesis should be 
different than zero, that is; 
              
The second order conditions for advertisement level of manufacturers are equal to; 
     
   
  
     
   
  
        
   
                                                                                     
We assume that the equation        is less than zero, in order to provide the profit 
functions to be concave in advertisement level. Under that condition we can state that 
the equation in (3.63) and (3.64) are profit maximizing advertisement levels. To 
check the stability conditions we calculate the following determinant. 
|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|  |
|
   
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
|
|   
    
   
                                  
In order to ensure the stability condition is hold,  
  
  
       should be verified. 
At the end of this sequential move game, we obtain the following optimal profits 
illustrated in table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Nash-Cournot optimal profits   
          Profits of Agents 
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3.2.2 The Centralized Model 
This model is a vertically integrated model in which each manufacturer merges with 
his exclusive retailer. Therefore, we have two competing chains after the merger 
occurred. In this model C1 indicates first chain, and C2 indicates second chain. The 
duopolistic vertical chains compete a la Cournot in distribution market. The purpose 
of each chain is to maximize the total channel profit while competing with the 
second chain for order quantity and advertisement level. Sharing the profit according 
to Nash bargaining scheme is the main incentive for mergers. That is, the system 
total profit will be divided between the manufacturer and retailer for each chain. 
Backward induction is implemented in order to find the Nash-Cournot equilibrium 
levels. The nature of the game is illustrated in the figure 3.5 below. 
 
Figure 3.5: Vertical merger 
In the vertical merger model the manufacturer sells the product with a price equal to 
marginal production cost. In other words, there is no wholesale price in this model. 
The manufacturer and retailer of each chain act together to maximize the channel 
total profit. The firms in each chain will share the chain’s profit according to two 
rules: Nash Bargaining scheme, and equal division rule. Also, we will show which 
sharing rule encourages the firms for merger. We will compare the profit gain of 
each agents of the chain under both division rules with the profit of the agents in 
competitive model. 
We have the following profit function for each chain; 
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As we see in the profit functions (3.66) and        the vertically merged firms have 
production and advertising costs. We use a quadratic cost function for advertisement, 
to ensure the diminishing return of investment. 
The game will be solved in two stages by the help of backward induction. In the first 
stage the chains decide their advertisement level, and in the second stage they choose 
their output levels. 
 
Stage 2: Each Chain Determine Quantity Level 
At the second stage of the game, each chain determines the quantity level taking the 
rival chain quantity level as given. The equilibriums of this stage are a function of 
advertisement level. 
To find the Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantity decision of each chain, we maximize 
the profit functions of each chain stated in (3.66) and       . The first order 
conditions that we found by taking the first order derivatives of the profit functions 
are solved for each quantity level. Then we obtain the following Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium quantities; 
    
   
   
 ̅ 
   
                
  
                                                                                    
    
   
   
 ̅ 
   
                
  
                                                                                    
The second order conditions are satisfied since we assume that   is positive. 
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Hence, we can say that the profit functions of vertically merged firms are concave in 
   and   , and the equilibrium quantities makes the chain’s profit maximal. The 
stability conditions of stage 2 is satisfied, since the determinant in        is always 
positive. So, the quantities that we have been found by solving first order conditions 
are unique Nash-Counot equilibriums. 
|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|                                                                                                   
Stage 1: Each Chain Determine Advertisement Level 
At the first stage of the game, the manufacturer of each chain determine the 
equilibrium advertising level taking the rival advertising decision as given. For this 
stage of the game, we reconstruct the profit functions by substituting the equilibrium 
quantities in the equations        and        into the vertically merged chains’ 
profit functions. Then we obtain the new profit function of chain1 and chain2 
respectively as; 
           ̅ 
   
   
 
 
                                                                                                  
           ̅ 
   
   
 
 
                                                                                                  
When we maximize the profit functions of chains by solving the first order 
conditions with respect to advertising levels, we get the following reaction functions; 
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When we solve these equations simultaneously, we obtain the Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium advertising levels that maximize the profit of vertically merged chains as 
in                  ; 
 ̅  
                        
         
             
                                              
 ̅  
                        
         
             
                                              
We require the denominator terms in parenthesis to be different than zero to assure 
the concavity of advertising level. 
In order to ensure the profit functions of the chains are concave in equilibrium 
advertising levels, the second order conditions should be verified. 
     
   
  
   
  
                                                                                                                    
     
   
  
   
  
                                                                                                                    
The equations in        and        are satisfied for some specific values of 
exogenous variables. Therefore, the profit functions are concave in advertising level, 
and the first order conditions can make chains’ profit maximal. 
The stability conditions of advertising level are checked by the following 
determinant; 
|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|   
    
  
                                                                                 
The expression in        is verified if  
  
  
 
 
 
 , then we assure the uniqueness of 
Nash-Cournot equilibriums for advertising levels. 
After we replace the equilibrium advertising level into the profit functions        
and       , we obtain the optimal profits of both chains in terms of exogenous 
variables as illustrated in table 3.4 below. 
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Table  3.4: Nash-Cournot optimal profits under vertical merger   
          Vertical Merger Profits  
     
 
                                
         
 
              
 
  
     
                                
         
 
              
 
 
3.2.3 Comparison of the Profits 
In this part we will compare the competitive and centralized model profits. As we 
stated in benchmark case, if a merger is profitable, the merger profit should be 
greater than the total profit of the agents under competitive case. Therefore, we will 
investigate whether the profit increase or not when firms vertically merged. For a 
profitable merger the following condition should be hold for each chain; 
                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                       
The left hand sides of the expression        and        is the total merger profit of 
chain1 and chain 2 respectively. After we replace the corresponding profits into the 
expression        and        we obtain the following inequalities; 
                                
         
 
              
 
                                    
         
 
                 
 
                         
         
 
              
                            
                                
         
 
              
 
                                   
          
 
                 
 
                        
          
 
              
                                                        
Due to the complexity of the expressions in        and        we will proceeds the 
analysis by assigning numerical values to the parameters satisfying second order and 
stability conditions for each stage. Throughout our numerical analysis the following 
conditions are valid. 
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As in benchmark case, we assigned the following numerical values to the exogenous 
variables. The second order conditions and stability conditions are verified 
    ,      ,    ,      ,       
The figure 3.6 shows that, the merger profit of chain 1 is greater than the total profit 
of manufacturer 1 and retailer 1 under competitive model. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Chain 1 profits before and after merger 
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Observation 3.1: Taking the other variables’ numerical values fixed, as far as 
      the merger profit of the chain 1 is greater than the total profit of 
manufacturer 1 and retailer 1 when they act in a competitive environment.  
Observation 3.2: Taking the numerical values of other variables as fixed, as   
increases the gap between the profits before and after the merger is increase. 
Observation 3.3: Taking the numerical values of other variables as fixed, for large 
values of   the merger is profitable only in small market sizes. 
Observation 3.4: Taking the numerical values of other variables as fixed, for large 
values of   the merger is profitable only in small market sizes. 
When we apply a similar analysis for the second chain we obtain the figure 3.7 
 
Figure 3.7: Chain 2 profits before and after merger 
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As we show in the figure 3.7 merger is not profitable for the second chain. That is to 
say, the total profit of manufacturer 2 and retailer 2 under the competitive model is 
greater than the merger profit of the channel. 
Observation 3.5: Taking the numerical values of other variables as fixed, as far as 
      the merger profit of the second chain is smaller than the total profit of 
manufacturer 2 and retailer 2 under the competitive environment. 
Observation 3.6: Taking the numerical values of other variables as fixed, as   
increases the merger will be more profitable. 
Observation 3.7: Taking the numerical values of other variables as fixed, as   
increases the merger and non-merger profits decreases, and the gap between profits 
before and after the merger increases. 
Observation 3.8: Taking the numerical values of other variables as fixed, if     
merger is profitable, but if     the merger profit is less than total competitive 
profit. 
Hence, we observe that at least for some specific values of parameters merger is 
profitable for the first chain which has a smaller marginal production cost, but it is 
not profitable for the second chain. So, merger is a rational behavior for first chain’s 
agents. In the following section, we will analyze the possible reaction of the second 
chain’s agents when first chain members take merger decision. 
3.2.4 Semi Centralized Model (Chain 1 Merge, Chain 2 Separated) 
When chain 1 takes merger decision, chain 2 agents have two possible reactions; 
merge or remain separated. We have been showed that merger is not profitable for 
the second chain. In other words, the second chain merger profit does not exceed the 
total profit of members of the second chain when they independently maximize their 
own profits. We have analyzed the merger decision of chain 2 agents when chain 1 
takes merger decision. Now, we will investigate the non-merger decision of chain 2 
when chain 1 merges. The figure 3.8 illustrates the nature of the game when first 
chain merge, but second chain remains separated. 
36 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Chain 1 merge, chain 2 remains separated 
The main difference of this case is that, in the second chain the manufacturer sells 
the product with a wholesale price larger than marginal production cost, but the first 
chain manufacturer provides product for her exclusive retailer at a price equals to 
marginal production cost. We will analyze this model in three stages by using 
backward induction. At the first stage of the game, the vertically merged chain and 
manufacturer 2 choose their advertising level. At the second stage of the game, 
manufacturer two determine wholesale price for her product. At the last stage of the 
game retailer 2 compete with vertically merged firms for output level. We will 
analyze the model from last stage of the game to the first by using backward 
induction method. 
Stage 3: Vertically Merged Chain and Retailer 2 Determine Quantity Level 
At the third stage of the game, vertically merged firms and second retailer determines 
their quantity level, taking the rival decision as given. The equilibrium quantities that 
we have been found at this stage are the function of advertising levels and second 
manufacturer wholesale price level. The profit functions are shown below. 
             
   
 
 
                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                             
In order to find the profit maximal quantities at this stage, we differentiate        
and (3.85) with respect to    and   , and  then we simultaneously solve the first 
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order conditions  for    and    by setting the derivatives equal to zero. Then, we 
obtain the following Nash-Cournot quantities; 
    
   
   
 ̅  
                
  
                                                                                      
    
   
   
 ̅  
                
  
                                                                                      
The second order conditions are satisfied since; 
     
   
  
     
   
        
The stability condition is also satisfied since the following determinant is always 
positive. 
|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|                                                                                                    
Stage 2: manufacturer 2 Determine Wholesale Price 
At the second stage of the game the second manufacturer choose wholesale price 
level. After we substitute the equilibrium quantities in the expression        into the 
second manufacturer’s profit function we obtain the following profit function for this 
stage of the game. 
            ̅  
   
 
 
                                                                                                 ) 
When we maximize the profit of manufacturer 2 by solving the first order condition 
for   , we obtain the profit maximizing wholesale price level in terms of advertising 
level of chain 1 and manufacturer 2. 
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 ̅  
 
 
                                                                                                 ) 
Second order condition is verified since we assume that   is positive. 
     
   
   
 
  
   
Stage 1: Vertically Merged Chain 1 and Manufacturer 2 Determine Advertising 
Level 
At the first stage of the game, this is last stage of backward induction method, 
manufacturer 2 and vertically merged firms simultaneously determine the profit 
maximizing advertising level. We obtain the profit functions for this stage, after we 
substitute the equilibrium output and wholesale price level into expression in      ) 
and      ). 
           ̅  
   
 
 
                                                                                                     
      ̅      ̅  
   
 
 
                                                                                                 ) 
Differentiating     and     with respect to advertising levels A1 and A2 
respectively, setting the derivatives equal to zero, and solving for A1 and A2 , we 
obtain the following reaction function for advertising levels. 
    
   
   
    
                   
         
                                                                              
    
   
   
    
               
       
                                                                                         
By solving the equations        and        simultaneously, we obtain the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium advertising levels as follows; 
 ̅  
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 ̅  
                       
          
              
                                              
 In order to show the profit functions are concave in advertising level and the 
equilibriums we have found can make the profits maximal, we have to show that the 
second order conditions are verified.  
     
   
  
    
   
                                                                                                           
     
   
  
  
   
                                                                                                          
If the expression in        and        are satisfied, then we can say second order 
conditions provide sufficient evidence for equilibriums to be exact point that 
maximize the profits. After we simplify the expression in        and        we 
obtain the following conditions; 
  
  
 
  
  
                                                                                                                                   
  
  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                  
Since the expression in        is binding, it is necessary condition for the second 
order conditions to be satisfied. We also have to check the stability of the equilibrium 
advertising levels. For a stable and unique equilibrium of advertising level the 
following determinant should be verified. 
|
|
     
   
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
|
|   
     
   
                                                                           
For the expression in         to be hold, 
  
  
       
Since we choose the parameters regarding second order and stability condition, the 
profit functions are concave in advertising level. The stability condition in         
is a binding condition for the second order conditions in        and        . Hence, 
all of the necessary conditions are satisfied for an equilibrium to be unique and 
stable. 
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The Nash-Cournot optimal profit functions are obtained by substituting the 
equilibrium output, advertising, and wholesale price levels into the profit functions 
stated in        ,         and        . The table 3.5 shows the equilibrium profits.  
Table 3.5: Profits of agents when chain 1 merge, chain 2 remain separated 
          Profits of Agents When Chain 1 Merge, Chain 2 Remain Separated 
 ̈   
 
                               
         
 
                
 
 ̈   
 
                                
          
 
                
 
 ̈   
 
                       
          
 
             
 
Comparison of Profits for Chain 2  
As we mentioned above, when chain 1 takes merger decision chain 2 will either 
merge or remain separated. Now, we will compare the profits of chain 2 when they 
collaborate and when they act independently. 
      ̈    ̈                                                                                                                 
The left hand side of           is the merger profit of chain 2, and right hand side is 
the total profit when the agents of the second chain act independently. After we 
replace the corresponding profits into the expression          we obtain the 
following inequality. 
                                
         
 
              
 
                                
          
 
                
 
                       
          
 
             
                                                      
Due to the complexity of the expression in          we will proceeds the analysis 
by assigning numerical values to the parameters satisfying second order and stability 
conditions for each stage. 
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of profits for chain 2 
Observation 3.9: When chain 1 takes merger decision, the second chain merger 
profit is greater than non-merger profit independent of marginal production costs of 
manufacturers. 
As a result, at least for some numerical values of parameter satisfying second order 
and stability conditions at each stage, merger is profitable for chain 1. When chain 1 
takes merger decision, the best response reaction of chain 2 is merger decision, too. 
So, the profits of the chain will be divided between the agents of each chain 
according to Nash bargaining scheme when both of chains take merger decision.  
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4. PROFIT DIVISION 
4.1 Nash Arbitration Scheme 
The profit division for each chain will be done according to Nash bargaining rule. 
Since chain 1 is dominant in the process of taking merger decision, in case of 
disagreement the outside options for chain 1 agents are the profits under competitive 
model. Chain 2 will choose her best reaction according to chain 1 behavior. We 
showed that, the merger profit of chain 2 is smaller than the total profit of 
manufacturer 2 and retailer 2 when they act in competitive model. However, when 
chain 1 take merger decision, taking merger decision is more profitable than 
remaining separated. Since chain 2 chooses her action after chain 1 makes decision, 
in case of disagreement chain 2 agents’ outside options are the profits when they 
operate in the market independently. The profits that will be divided and 
disagreement options are illustrated in the table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Division profits and disagreement options 
 Profit for Allocation  Disagreement Option 
Chain1 
                                
         
 
              
 
M1 
                                    
         
 
                 
 
R1 
                         
         
 
              
 
Chain2 
                                
         
 
              
 
M2 
                                
          
 
                
 
R2 
                       
          
 
             
 
45 
 
Nash arbitration scheme is concerned with allocating the profit on the negotiation set. 
Any allocation on the set is Pareto optimal, and equal or greater than the 
disagreement point. As we mentioned above, the disagreement point is the profit 
incurred by the players in a non-cooperate game. The Nash arbitration scheme can be 
obtained by solving; 
                                                                                                                      
s.t.             
                  
               ,           
   denotes the player i’s allocated profit,    denotes the disagreement option, i=1,2; 
and P is the set of Pareto optimal solutions. 
In our study, the manufacturer and retailer of each chain bargain for the allocation of 
the chain merger profit. So, the Pareto optimal set is the total of    and    which is 
equal to chain merger profit. After we replace the corresponding terms into the 
expression      , and solve the maximization problem for     and    we obtain the 
following allocations for chain 1 and chain 2 members. 
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Table 4.2: Profits under Nash arbitration scheme 
  Profits Under Nash Arbitration Scheme 
M1 
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4.2 Equal Division Rule 
Instead of Nash arbitration scheme if we equally allocate the profit of each chain 
between the agents of the channel, we obtain the results illustrated in table 4.3 
Table 4.3: Profits under equal division rule 
 Equal Allocation of Profits  
M1 
                                
         
 
               
 
R1 
                                
         
 
               
 
M2 
                                
         
 
               
 
R2 
                                
         
 
               
 
4.3 Numerical Analysis of Profit Allocation 
Due to the complexity of algebraic analysis, we will conduct a numerical analysis by 
assigning specific values to the parameters satisfying second order, and stability 
condition at each stage of the game. As we have emphasized above, throughout the 
numerical analysis the following assumptions are valid. 
             ,    ,     
The following numerical values of parameters verify all necessary conditions. 
                              
Table 4.4: Nash allocation scheme 
 Non-Merger 
Profits 
Total Chain 
Profits 
Merger 
Profits 
Total Chain 
Profits 
M1 192 
330.2 
204.7 
355.6 
R1 138.2 150.9 
M2 92 
156 
127.8 
227.6 
R2 64 99.8 
By this numerical example, as illustrated in table 4.4, we can find that the agents of 
both chain gain more profit when they act in collusion. In other words, merger is 
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profitable for both chains. The profit of each agent of chain 1 increases by more than 
12 units. The non-merger profits of chain 2 are the profits when chain 1 merges. The 
profit of each agent of the chain 2 increases by more than 35 units. We can conclude 
that, Nash arbitration scheme can be used as a revenue sharing contract to coordinate 
the supply chain agents.  
Table 4.5: Equal allocation of profits 
 Non-Merger 
Profits 
Total Chain 
Profits 
Merger 
Profits 
Total Chain 
Profits 
M1 192 
330.2 
177.8 
355.6 
R1 138.2 177.8 
M2 92 
156 
113.8 
227.6 
R2 64 113.8 
As shown in the table 4.5, equal division is less profitable for manufacturers, but 
opposite for the retailers. For example, under equal division rule retailer 2 gains more 
than 49 units, but the manufacturer 2 gains about 21 units after the merger. More 
importantly, the profit of the manufacturer 1 after the merger is less than non-merger 
case. Therefore, manufacturer 1 does not merge under equal division rule. So, equal 
division rule cannot be used as a revenue sharing rule to coordinate the supply chain 
agents. 
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Table 4.6: Model comparison 
 
Non-Merger Profits 
(Competitive Model) 
Total 
Profit 
Chain1 Merge, Chain2 Separated  
(Semi Centralized Model) 
Total 
Profit 
Both Chain Merge 
(Centralized Model) 
Total 
Profit 
M1 192 
330.2 M1+R1 476 M1+R1 355.5 
R1 138.2 
M2 143.3 
246.5 
92 
156 M2+R2 227.5 
R2 103.2 64 
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The table 4.6 compares the profits of three models. As we see in the table, 
independent of chain 2 behaviors, merger is profitable for chain 1. In any case, 
merger is not profitable for chain 2. However, when chain 1 agents cooperate, then 
merger is more profitable than remain separated for chain 2 agents. 
51 
 
5. THE EFFECT OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES ON EQUILIBRIUM 
VALUES 
In figure 5.1 and 5.2 we let advertising coefficient changes from 0 to 1 given other 
exogenous variables fixed, the optimal profits of manufacturers and retailers will 
increase before and after merger. (The superscripts a and b indicate the profits after 
and before merger, respectively). The effect of an increase in   has lager positive 
effect on merger profits.  For large value of   the gap between the profits of 
manufacturers under Nash allocation scheme will decrease. 
 
Figure 5.1: The effect of θ on manufacturers’ profits 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The effect of θ on retailers’ profits 
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In figure 5.3 and 5.4 we let advertising cost, ρ, changes from 0.2 to 1 given other 
exogenous variables fixed, the optimal profits of manufacturers and retailers 
decreases. If advertisement is highly costly, then merger may loss its attraction for 
manufacturer 1. Even though the cost of advertising is high, the difference between 
profits of manufacturer 2 before and after merger is considerable high. 
 
Figure 5.3: The effect of ρ on manufacturers’ profits 
 
Figure 5.4: The effect of ρ on retailers’ profits 
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In table 5.1 we will analyze the effect of   on equilibrium advertising level, output, 
and price for both chains. In this numerical example, we let   increasing from 0.1 to 
1. Given other exogenous variables fixed, the optimal advertising levels increase 
from 2.2 to 170.6, and from 1.6 to 165.3 for chain 1 and chain 2 respectively. We can 
find that, the optimal advertising levels are positively affected by  .  
Observation 5.1: The advertising expenses of chain 1 is greater than advertising 
expenses of chain 2 regardless of the degree of    
It is reasonable, because chain 1 has larger market share than chain 2. That is to say, 
chain 2 has more costumer than chain 1 which means chain 1 agents spends more 
expense in advertising while competing with chain 2.  
Another finding is that, the retailer price is rising by an increase in  . It is meaningful 
because increases in   positively affects the brand image which means the costumers 
will likely demand the product.  
                        Table 5.1: The effect of   on equilibrium values 
    
    
    
    
     
0.1 2.2 1.6 16.1 12.1 22.1 
0.4 9.8 7.6 18.3 14.3 24.3 
0.7 25 21.3 26.8 22.8 32.8 
0.9 62.4 57.6 52 48 58 
1 170.6 165.3 128 124 134 
 
Observation 5.2: When   increases; advertising expenses, output levels, and retail 
price decreases (see table 5.2). It is reasonable, because when   rises advertising 
becomes more expensive. Therefore, firms will reduce their advertising expenses 
which lead to a reduction output level and retail price.  
                        Table 5.2: The effect of ρ on equilibrium values 
    
    
    
    
     
0.2 55.8 49.2 33.5 29.5 39.5 
0.3 26.9 22.5 24.2 20.2 30.2 
0.5 13.3 10.7 20 16 26 
0.7 8.9 6.9 18.6 14.6 24.6 
0.9 6.7 5.2 17.9 13.9 23.9 
1 5.9 4.6 17.8 13.8 23.8 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study a two echelon supply chain system consisting of two 
competing manufacturer and two competing retailers. Each manufacturer produces a 
price dependent product and sells through an exclusive retailer to end consumers. We 
have studied the manufacturer-retailer coordination behaviors in vertically merged 
supply chain by applying Nash arbitration scheme as a revenue sharing contract. The 
optimal pricing, advertising, and quantity decision are provided for duopolistic 
manufacturers and retailer under a vertically merged supply chain. We perform the 
analysis of mergers that are assumed to be legally possible. We have showed that 
regardless of chain 2 behaviors, merger is profitable for chain 1 agents. We 
investigate the possible behaviors of chain 2 agents when chain 1 takes merger 
decision. We have showed that the best response behavior of chain 2 to the merger 
decision of chain 1 is merger decision. Hence, we perform Nash arbitration scheme 
in order to allocate the profit of each channel between manufacturer and retailer. We 
also compare the Nash arbitration scheme with the equal division rule in which the 
profit of merger is equally divided between the agents of the chains. We can 
conclude that, Nash arbitration scheme can be used as a revenue sharing contract to 
coordinate the supply chains. 
We use some numerical examples to show how exogenous variables affect the 
optimal advertising level, pricing, and quantity level of each chain. We figure out 
that when a chain market share becomes large, advertising expenses raises. In 
addition, the optimal advertising expenses, output levels, and retail price decreases. 
A potential topic for the future research could be to analyze a common retailer 
supply chain with competitive retail market. The study of vertical merger in this 
paper could be extended by including horizontal merger. In general one side of 
supply chain is more powerful than the other side of the chain. So, analyzing the 
model under Stackelberg game structure may help to determine other dimensions of 
supply chain studies. In addition to Nash arbitration scheme, Talmudic division, 
shapley value could be used as a revenue sharing contract to coordinate supply chain 
agents. 
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